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This paper aims to understand better the innovation potential of a ﬁrm’s alliance network.
Here we analyze the role of an alliance network in terms of the technological distance
betweenpartners,aﬁrm’snetworkposition(centrality)andtotalnetworkdensity.Westudy
how these three elements of an alliance network, separately and in combination, affect
the ‘twin tasks’ in exploration, namely novelty creation on the one hand and its efﬁcient
absorption on the other hand. For an empirical test, we study technology-based alliance
networks in the pharmaceutical, chemical and automotive industries. Our ﬁndings indi-
cate that successful exploration indeed seems to require a delicate balance between these
two exploration tasks. A second conclusion is that different network positions yield differ-
ent pay-offs in terms of the number of explorative patents. In other words, success rates for
explorationarenotspreadequallyacrossﬁrms.However,positionalonedoesnottellthefull
story. Our empirical ﬁndings clearly indicate that exploration success also depends on the
other two dimensions of embeddedness, namely technological distance and network den-
sity. The three elements of network embeddedness need to be considered jointly in order to
understand their complementary effects on both novelty creation and absorptive capacity.
© 2008 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Thereisnowincreasingconsensusintheacademicliter-
ature that a ﬁrm’s embeddedness in a network of interﬁrm
relations matters for its economic and innovative perfor-
mance (Nooteboom, 1992; Hagedoorn, 1993; Powell et al.,
1996; Rowley et al., 2000; Ahuja, 2000a; Owen-Smith and
Powell, 2004). The empirical evidence has indicated that
this relationship between embeddedness and innovation
can be found in industries as diverse as chemicals (Ahuja,
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2000a), biotechnology (Baum et al., 2000; Powell et al.,
1996), semiconductors (Stuart, 1998), textiles (Uzzi, 1997),
personal computers (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002) and
banking (Zaheer and Bell, 2005). More recently, some stud-
ies have started to unravel this notion of embeddedness in
order to understand in what speciﬁc ways it contributes
to a ﬁrm’s innovation performance. Here, characteristics
of partners have been studied such as their degree of
innovativeness (Stuart, 1998) as well as the properties of
alliances such as the role of formal governance mecha-
nisms(Moweryetal.,1996),equityvs.non-equityalliances
(Rowleyetal.,2000)ortheroleofrepeatedcontacts(Wuyts
et al., 2005). Beyond the dyad level, studies at the network
level have shown that the properties of an alliance net-
work also affect innovation. Here it has been shown that
apart from the number of direct ties (Ahuja, 2000a; Shan
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et al., 1994) also a ﬁrm’s indirect ties (Ahuja, 2000b) and
the redundancy among these ties (Ahuja, 2000b; Baum et
al., 2000; McEvily and Zaheer, 1999) affect its innovation
performance.
In most of these studies an important function of
alliances is that they function as ‘pipelines’ through which
information and knowledge ﬂows between ﬁrms (Owen-
Smith and Powell, 2004). This focus on the diffusion
potential of alliances may not be surprising as most
studies on the role of embeddedness have been assum-
ing conditions of relative environmental stability. Here,
embeddedness refers to routinisation and stabilization
of linkages among members as a result of a history of
exchanges and relations within a group or community
(Gulati,1998).Undersuchstructure-reinforcingconditions,
the role of embeddedness is increasingly well under-
stood (Gulati, 1998; Madhavan et al., 1998; Koka et al.,
2006). These conditions connect with March’s category of
exploitation (1991) in which environmental uncertainty
is rather limited and the focus is on the reﬁnement and
extension of existing competences and technologies. The
rationale for teaming up with partners then is formed by
possibilities to obtain complementary know-how (Teece,
1986) and/or to speed up the R&D process in indus-
tries where time-to-market is crucial. Here, cooperation is
attractive as partners have a good understanding of the rel-
evantissuesathandandalliancesenablearapiddiffusionof
knowledge among partners, enhancing the efﬁciency and
speed of cooperation (Gilsing, 2005).
In this strand of literature, an implicit underlying
assumption is that similarity of partners is beneﬁcial for
learning and innovation. This follows from Cohen and
Levinthal’s (1990) inﬂuential notion of absorptive capac-
ity, where the idea that the extent to which ﬁrms can
learn from external knowledge may be largely dependent
upon the similarity of the partners’ knowledge bases. In
a similar vein, different studies have demonstrated that
learning potential declines with an increase in dissimilar-
ity of knowledge stocks (Hamel, 1991; Lane and Lubatkin,
1998; Mowery et al., 1996; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001).
So,forinter-organisationallearninginexploitation,similar-
ity is attractive and distances in knowledge and cognition
(cognitive distance) constitute a liability.
This raises the question of how to understand the role
of network embeddedness in view of exploration that
can be characterized by breaking away from the estab-
lished way of doing things, with a focus on the discovery
and experimentation of new technologies (March, 1991;
Nooteboom, 2000). By its very nature, exploration is not
about efﬁciency of current activities, but rather forms
an uncertain process that deals with the search for new,
technology-based business opportunities (Rowley et al.,
2000; Nooteboom, 2000), requiring the production of new
insights and knowledge. This points to a different role of
a ﬁrm’s alliance network, namely its recombination poten-
tialfornewknowledgecreationratherthanitsfunctionasa
channelfordiffusionofexistinginformationandknowledge
for exploitation. Existing literature has largely ignored this
roleofalliancesfornoveltycreationandisthereforeunable
to explain the development of new knowledge and compe-
tencies (Hagedoorn et al., 2000; Phelps, 2005). In contrast
to exploitation, in this process of exploration partner sim-
ilarity is unattractive whereas cognitive distance between
partners forms an important asset.
The main aim of this paper is to develop an under-
standing of the role of a ﬁrm’s alliance network in view
of exploration. To do so, we will ﬁrst consider this role of
cognitive distance between ﬁrms in order to understand
how far dissimilarity between partners is attractive in view
of exploration. Second, we combine such a cognitive view
with a social structural one. In this way we complement
the literature that has predominantly focused on the role
of economic and social factors regarding alliance forma-
tion and the role of network embeddedness (Gulati, 1998).
A cognition-based understanding of these processes, how-
ever, is still in its infancy (Moran, 2005).
Combiningtheroleofcognitiveandsocialstructuralfac-
torsmayprovideuswithnewinsightsintowhatconstitutes
an optimal network structure for exploration. As we will
argue, for exploration ﬁrms are faced with a dual task. On
theonehand,theyneedtodevelopaccesstoheterogeneous
sources of knowledge and in this way create a potential for
novel combinations. This requires an emphasis on diver-
sity and disintegrated network structures, which is related
to Burt’sargument(1992)stressingthebeneﬁtsofaccessto
non-redundant contacts to obtain novel information (nov-
elty value).
On the other hand, ﬁrms need to make sure that such
novel knowledge, once accessed, is evaluated, and when
proven to be valuable is adequately absorbed. This process
favours more homogeneous network structures in view of
integrating the diverse inputs obtained from distant part-
ners (Hansen, 1999). This is more in line with Coleman’s
view (1988) stressing the beneﬁts of redundant network
structures. Given these differences between the two tasks,
we claim that a ﬁrm’s network will impact differently on
eachtask.So,animportantcontributionofthispaperisthat
it investigates how far optimal embeddedness for novelty
creationmayformaburdenforabsorptivecapacityandvice
versa. In this way, we may shed new light on the ongoing
debate on the validity of the arguments by Burt, favour-
ing structural holes, versus those of Coleman, favouring
closure.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we elab-
orate our theoretical argument and formulate a number of
hypotheses. Then, in Section 3, we present details about
the data, the speciﬁcation of variables, and the estimation
method. In Section 4 we present our main ﬁndings. Finally,
inSection5,weprovideadiscussionoftheresults,themain
conclusions and some indications for further research.
2. Theory and hypotheses
As argued above, the central focus of this paper is on the
role of a ﬁrm’s alliance network regarding the ‘twin tasks’
of on the one hand creating novel combinations, and on the
other hand the build-up of absorptive capacity for under-
standing such novel combinations. To understand its role,
we study a ﬁrm’s alliance network along three dimensions.
First, following Nooteboom et al. (2005), we consider the
role of cognitive distance among the ﬁrms making up such
an alliance network. Here, cognitive distance refers to theV. Gilsing et al. / Research Policy 37 (2008) 1717–1731 1719
extent that ﬁrms differ in their technological knowledge
and expertise. Next we focus on the role of a ﬁrm’s posi-
tion in a network. As a third element of a ﬁrm’s alliance
network we study the role of network density. By consid-
ering cognitive distance as well as position and network
density we combine a cognitive view of a ﬁrm’s alliance
network with a social structural view. Whereas a cogni-
tive view elucidates the potential for recombination due
to distances in cognition between ﬁrms, a social structural
view highlights how technology-based alliances serve as
the mechanism for crossing such distances and accessing
(proximate and distant) partners. In this way, combining




The distinction between exploration and exploitation
goes back to Holland (1975) and was later further devel-
oped by March (1991). Exploitation can be characterized
as a process of routinisation, which adds to the exist-
ing knowledge base and competence set of ﬁrms without
changingthenatureofactivities(March,1991).Thisresem-
bles ‘local search’ in which ﬁrms search for new knowledge
thatislesslikelytoconﬂictwiththeirexistingcognitiveand
mental models (Nelson and Winter, 1982).1 They develop
moreandmorecompetenceintheirparticularﬁeld,further
increasing the chance of immediate and positive returns.
Exploitation may therefore increase a ﬁrm’s innovative
performance due to returns from specialization, however
it may also lead to technological obsolescence and leave
ﬁrms locked out from new developments (March, 1991;
Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). To escape from this lock-in sit-
uation, ﬁrms need to engage in so-called exploration that
canbecharacterizedbybreakingwithanexistingdominant
design and shifting away from existing rules, norms, rou-
tines and activities, in search of novel combinations. Hence
exploration is not about efﬁciency of current activities and
cannot be planned for. It is an uncertain process that is
characterized by a constant search for new opportunities.2
Although the literature agrees on the fact that alliance
networks form an important instrument in this process
(Powell et al., 1996; Rowley et al., 2000), there is very lim-
ited empirical evidence of how they facilitate the creation
of new knowledge in this process of exploration.
An important issue here is that we take a ﬁrm’s per-
spective on exploration. In other words, in this paper
we will focus on the creation of technological knowl-
edge that is new to the ﬁrm. So, we consider knowledge
as novel and the activities to create such knowledge as
exploratory if they fall outside a ﬁrm’s existing knowledge
stock, even though they may have been in existence ear-
1 Underlying this is the idea of the relative inertia of ﬁrms, as advanced
bypopulationecologythatﬁrmsarebetteratdoingmoreofthesamethan
at adapting to change (Carroll and Hannan, 2000).
2 Exploration and exploitation are related and build on each other:
exploration develops into exploitation, and exploration emerges from
exploitation, in ways that go beyond the present paper (see for a further
discussion Nooteboom, 2000; Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006).
Fig. 1. Novelty and absorptive capacity.
lier elsewhere. This clearly differs from exploration that
yields knowledge that is new to the industry or perhaps
even new to the world. These latter two form ‘newly
emerging’ and respectively ‘pioneering’ technologies, rep-
resenting (much) more radical types of exploration (Ahuja
and Lampert, 2001).
2.2. Role of technological distance
Regarding the role of cognitive distance, Nooteboom
(1999) proposed a model, which was tested by Wuyts et al.




as cognitive distance increases, it has a positive effect on
learning by interaction because it yields opportunities for
novelcombinationsofcomplementaryresources.However,
at a certain point cognitive distance becomes so large as to
precludesufﬁcientmutualunderstandingneededtoutilize
those opportunities (see also Fig. 1).
Of course, a certain degree of mutual understanding is
needed for collaboration, and familiarity certainly breeds
trust (Gulati, 1995a), which facilitates successful collabo-
ration. However, too much familiarity may take out the
innovative steam from collaboration. The challenge then
is to ﬁnd partners at sufﬁcient cognitive distance to learn
something new, but not so distant as to preclude mutual
understanding.
In general, cognitive distance entails more than just
technological distance, although there is correlation
between technological distance and distance in other
functional disciplines such as marketing, production and
engineering. In this paper, we specify cognitive distance in
terms of technological distance, for two empirical reasons.
First, our measure of innovative success will be based on
patents, and there technological knowledge is more dom-
inant. A second, more pragmatic argument is that it is not
clear precisely how other dimensions of cognitive distance
should be measured (cf. Wuyts et al., 2005).1720 V. Gilsing et al. / Research Policy 37 (2008) 1717–1731
The logic of the above argument can be reframed
in terms of technological distance: absorptive capacity
declines with technological distance, and novelty value
increases with it. For both effects of technological distance
the simplest effect would be linear, and this is hypothe-
sized until theoretical or empirical arguments emerge for a
more complicated effect. Seen in this way, innovative per-
formancebycollaborationishypothesizedtoarisefromthe
interaction(modelledasthemathematicalproduct)ofnov-
elty value and absorptive capacity. The basic idea here is
thatthereisaninverted-Ushapedrelationship.Mathemat-
ically:
AC = a0 − a1 · TD(a0,a 1 > 0), (1)
and
NV = b0 + b1 · TD(b0,b 1 > 0). (2)
where AC is the absorptive capacity, NV is the novelty value
and TD is the technological distance.
Theinnovationperformanceofcollaborationinthedyad
(=IP) is deﬁned as the product of the two linear effects:
IP = AC · NV (3)
Replacing AC and NV by the right-hand side of Eqs. (1) and
(2) yields:
IP = a0 · b0 + (a0 · b1 − b0 · a1)TD − a1 · b1 · TD2 (4)
Eq. (4) results in an inverse U-shaped effect if and only if:
a0 · b1 >b 0 · a1 (5)
In sum, this leads to our ﬁrst hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 1. Exploration is an inverse U-shaped func-
tion of technological distance.
2.3. Role of network position
Next to technological distance along any tie between
two actors, another complementary dimension of vari-
ety is the number and pattern of ties in a network.
Our purpose now is to add such network effects to the
effect of technological distance. In other words, we com-
bine effects from relational embeddedness (technological
distance) and structural embeddedness (network effects)
(Granovetter, 1985; Rowley et al., 2000).
Unlike the local search process of exploitation (March,
1991), the search process in exploration is ‘recombinant’,
reﬂecting the idea that novelty arises as the result of
(re)combining and transforming existing and novel ele-
ments of knowledge into something radically new (Nelson
and Winter, 1982; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tushman
and Rosenkopf, 1992; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). Here, the
role of an alliance network is that it brings together a vari-
ety of skills and experience, which provides a potential
for the generation of Schumpeterian novel combinations
(Schumpeter, 1939). In this case, alliances do not serve as
channels for the diffusion of existing knowledge and com-
petencies but rather generate a recombination potential
in view of new knowledge creation. This recombination
potential originates from the fact that knowledge, values
and behaviour are more homogeneous within groups than
between groups, so that ﬁrms connected across groups
have more access to alternative ways of thinking, giving
them more options for creating new combinations (Burt,
2004).3 To effectuate this recombination potential of its
alliance network, ﬁrms should develop ties to companies
thatarethemselvesnotconnectedtoaﬁrm’sexistinggroup
of partners. A tie will provide access to new informa-
tion and entrepreneurial opportunities to the extent that
it offers access to non-redundant sources of information
(Burt, 1992). Such a tie spans a structural hole. Structural
holes guarantee that the partnering companies on both
sides of the hole have access to different ﬂows of informa-
tion (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997) and that the information
that comes from these mutually unconnected allies is non-
redundant. Note that here we are looking at whether or
not ties exist, across structural holes, apart from the tech-
nological distance involved in any tie. A key issue here
is that possibilities to create such non-redundant ties are
not equally spread across ﬁrms. A ﬁrm’s network position
importantly conditions the possibility to create alliances
to such non-redundant partners and beneﬁt from these
accordingly. Central ﬁrms become better informed about
what is going on in the network. This increases possi-
bilities for central ﬁrms to initiate the formation of new
alliances (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001). Moreover, this
combination of timely access to important and novel infor-
mation and their higher status and power increases their
bargaining power (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Burt,
2004), which also improves possibilities to beneﬁt more
from their alliances than less central ﬁrms. Following this,
we expect that central ﬁrms form attractive partners to ally
with,whichenhancesthelikelihoodthatthesecentralplay-
ers, when engaging in exploration, will create alliances to
non-redundant partners and beneﬁt from these alliances
accordingly.Asaconsequence,weanticipatethatcentrality
has a positive effect on the search for novel combina-
tions and hence on exploration, in particular on novelty
value.
However, searching through non-redundant ties comes
at a price and bears certain risks. A consequence of hav-
ing access to many non-redundant ties is that central ﬁrms
have to deal with a higher volume of more diverse infor-
mation that will arrive at faster rates when compared with
less central ﬁrms (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001). This
consumes time and resources that cannot be allocated
for absorbing and integrating the obtained novel insights.
Second, a sole focus on searching for novelty through non-
redundant ties may result in a random drift so that a ﬁrm’s
knowledge base changes continuously in different and
unrelateddirections,makingtheaccessednovelknowledge
difﬁcult to absorb and integrate (Fleming and Sorenson,
2001; Ahuja and Katila, 2004). So, both from a search-costs
and a cognition point of view, too many non-redundant
ties will decrease the potential for novelty absorption. In
other words, centrality spurs the possibilities for novelty
creation but at high(er) levels it may impede the possibili-
ties for absorption of this novelty. Note that apart from the
3 “People who stand near the holes in a social structure are at a higher
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number of non-redundant ties one has, there is the issue of
technological distance along each tie.
Thus, we hypothesize that, next to effects of technologi-
caldistance,centralityhasapositiveeffectonnoveltyvalue
(NV) and a negative effect on absorptive capacity (AC), and
bythesamelogicasfortheeffectsoftechnologicaldistance,
with innovative performance being a product of NV and
AC), this yields an inverse U-shaped effect on exploration.
Hypothesis 2. Exploration is an inverse-U shaped func-
tion of network centrality.
2.4. Role of network density
In contrast to the effects of centrality, we anticipate that
network density limits the potential for novelty creation
whereas it enhances the build-up of absorptive capacity.
As we will argue, both direct and indirect ties play a role
in building up absorptive capacity. Therefore we consider
the role of ‘global network density’, which considers both
types of ties as a property of the total network, rather than
the density of ties surrounding a speciﬁc node. As we will
argue, both direct and indirect ties play a role in building
up absorptive capacity.
Novel knowledge from a direct partner, especially at
a large technological distance, may not be readily under-
standable for a ﬁrm. If one is not able to understand novel
information from a given source adequately, one may need
another partner to complement one’s absorptive capacity
(Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005). In other words, the extent
towhichone’spartnersarelinkedmayhelpindealingwith
technological distance to any of them. More precisely, if A
remains linked to both B and C, even if there is also a link
between B and C, this may help A to understand C by com-
paringwhatAunderstandsfromCwithwhatBunderstands
from C. This can matter especially when there is a large
technological distance between A and C. In other words,
even if a ﬁrm’s direct ties are known to be redundant for
access to sources of information, they may be needed both
to understand and to absorb knowledge accessed in the
other relation.
This is the case particularly when engaging in explo-
ration, where new and distant knowledge is accessed, and
dominantdesignsandstandardsmaybelacking.Moreover,
the often tacit and experimental nature of exploration fur-
ther increases the difﬁculty of ﬁrms to recognize and value
thetechnologyofpotentialpartnerswhentheyarenotcon-
nected through a common alliance partner. In this way, not
only direct but also indirect ties can enhance the absorp-
tive capacity of the ﬁrm by acting as device for screening
and interpreting novel information on its potential rele-
vance and value (Leonard-Barton, 1984; Vanhaverbeke et
al., 2008). In addition, even if one does understand a given
source, one may not be able to judge the reliability of infor-
mation, so that, like researchers in gathering potentially
biaseddata,onemayneedathirdpartyasasourcefortrian-
gulation (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005). In this way, ﬁrms
may be able to develop a richer understanding and a better
evaluation of the acquired novelty (Rowley et al., 2000).
In addition, a dense network of direct and indirect ties
also facilitates the build-up of trust, a reputation mech-
anism, and coalitions to constrain opportunism (Gulati,
1995a,b; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). These are the
prime arguments for closure, introduced by Coleman
(1988). They apply especially to exploration in view of the
uncertainty surrounding it, which limits options for gover-
nance by formal contracts (Nooteboom, 1999, 2002).
Now, density and its potential for trust building enables
a proliferation of triangulation, as follows. First, it is useful
for neighbours of the focal ﬁrm to be mutually connected
for triangulation. Next, information from any neighbour is
richer and more reliable to the extent that the neighbour
also proﬁts from triangulation among its neighbours.
So, density through direct ties and indirect ties plays
an important role with regard to assessing the reliability
of (technologically distant) sources of novelty as well as
understanding and evaluating these sources. In sum, we
propose that density enhances the absorptive capacity of
each individual ﬁrm in the network.
Let us now turn to the arguments against dense net-
works.Oneargumententailsthattherearecostsassociated
with establishing and maintaining contacts and that by
sheddingredundantties,ﬁrmscancreateefﬁciencyintheir
network (Burt, 1992). However, in exploration such costs
of redundancy play a limited role as the key focus here is
onﬁndingandabsorbingnovelty,makingconsiderationsof
efﬁciency less of an issue (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002;
Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005).
The main argument against high density, however, is
that it inhibits the existence and the utilization of diver-
sity, and hence of novelty value. When knowledge is more
densely spread across ﬁrms in the network, the beneﬁts of
direct ties and indirect ties in giving access to novelty will
decline, because ‘everyone knows what everyone knows’.
Firms are less likely to gain new or additional informa-
tion from their indirect ties, as the information that can be
obtained from them will be very similar to the knowledge
alreadyobtainedfromitsdirectcontacts.Asaconsequence,
thepotentialforcreatingnovelcombinationswilldiminish.
A dense network also increases the likelihood that
knowledgeandinformationreachingthecompanythrough
its alliance network also reaches its partners. This may cre-
ateariskofundesirablespillovers.Suchdiffusionofnovelty
throughout the network can put limits on its appropria-
tion and make it less attractive for ﬁrms to search for such
novelty (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005).
A ﬁnal argument against density is, as indicated before,
that it facilitates effective sanctions. As pointed out
by Coleman (1988), dense networks enable reputation
effects, and yield opportunities for coalitions to constrain
behaviour. This is useful for the governance of relational
risk, but may create strong behavioural pressures to con-
form rather than to be radically different (Kraatz, 1998).
Firms may also be pre-empted from entering into new,
more innovative relationships, as the implicit expectation
ofloyaltytotheirexistingpartnersandnetworkmayinhibit
them from allying with others (Buchko, 1994; Nooteboom,
1999; Duysters and Lemmens, 2003; Gulati et al., 2000).
In sum, density supports the build-up of shared absorp-
tive capacity but it may impede the possibilities for search
andnoveltycreation.Theseargumentsleadtothefollowing
hypothesis.1722 V. Gilsing et al. / Research Policy 37 (2008) 1717–1731
Hypothesis 3. Exploration is an inverse-U shaped func-
tion of density.
2.5. Combined effects
The effects of technological distance (TD) (Hypothesis
1),betweennesscentrality(BC)(Hypothesis2)andnetwork
density(D)(Hypothesis3)applysimultaneously,andhence
there are interaction effects between them. Theoretically,
theinverseU-shapedeffectsresultfromoppositeeffectson
absorptive capacity (AC) and novelty value (NV), which are
multiplied in their effects on exploration performance, as
speciﬁedpreviouslyfortheeffectoftechnologicaldistance.
In Hypothesis 1 we posited that technological distance
has a negative effect on absorptive capacity and a positive
effectonnoveltyvalue.InHypothesis2wearguedthatcen-
trality has a negative effect on absorptive capacity and a
positiveeffectonnoveltyvalue.InHypothesis3weassume
that network density has a positive effect on absorptive
capacity and a negative effect on novelty value.
For the combined effects, the full model then becomes:
AC = a0 − a1 · TD − a2 · BC + a3 · D (6)
NV = b0 + b1 · TD + b2 · BC − b3 · D,
a0,a 1,a 2,a 3,b 0,b 1,b 2,b 3 > 0 (7)
Multiplying (6) and (7) provides the equation for explo-
ration performance (IP):
IP = AC · NV = (a0 · b1 − b0 · a1) · TD + (a0 · b2 − b0 · a2)
·BC + (b0 · a3 − a0 · b3) · D − a1 · b1 · TD2
−a2 · b2 · BC
2−a3 · b3 · D2−(a1 · b2+a2 · b1)
·TD · BC + (a1 · b3 + a3 · b1) · TD · D
+(a2 · b3 + a3 · b2) · BC · D (8)
where
a0 · b1 >b 0 · a1,a 0 · b2 >b 0 · a2 and b0 · a3 >a 0 · b3
This mathematical model can be interpreted in the fol-
lowing way. The interaction effect of two variables on
exploration is negative when they have an effect in the
same direction on novelty value or on absorptive capac-
ity. These yield alternative ways for achieving those effects
and here the variables can be considered as substitutes.
Thisappliestotheinteractioneffectbetweentechnological
distance and betweenness centrality, which both enhance
novelty value while decreasing absorptive capacity. Thus,
such a combined increase in the potential for novelty value
with a decrease of the ability to absorb this novelty has
a negative net effect on exploration. Interaction effects
are positive when variables have opposite effects on nov-
elty value and on absorptive capacity. Here, the interacting
effects form complements. An increase in novelty value
is accompanied by an increase in the ability to absorb it.
This applies to the interaction effects between technologi-
cal distance and density as well as to the interaction effect
betweenbetweennesscentralityanddensity.Inbothcases,
an increase in novelty value, due to an increase of techno-
logical distance or an increase of centrality, is accompanied
by an increase in absorptive capacity due to an increase of
network density.
In other words, there are alternative strategies for
the maximization of exploration. High (low) technologi-
cal distance would need to be compensated by low (high)
betweenness centrality and/or high (low) density. High
(low) betweenness centrality would have to be compen-
sated by low (high) technological distance and/or high
(low) density. High (low) density would have to be com-
pensated by high (low) technological distance and/or high
(low) betweenness centrality.
In sum, this leads to our ﬁnal three hypotheses as fol-
lows.
Hypothesis 4. The interaction between technological dis-
tance and betweenness centrality has a negative effect on
exploration.
Hypothesis 5. The interaction between technological dis-
tance and density has a positive effect on exploration.
Hypothesis6. Theinteractionbetweenbetweennesscen-
trality and density has a positive effect on exploration.
3. Data and methods
3.1. Data
The sample set for this study consisted of panel data
on the alliance and patenting activities of 116 companies
in the chemicals, automotive and pharmaceutical indus-
tries. The reason for choosing these three industries is
that they share the importance of investing in R&D and
innovation, but that they also reveal profound differences
regarding some key characteristics such as the stage of
industrydevelopment(Walkeretal.,1997),theimportance
of exploration vis-à-vis exploitation (Rowley et al., 2000)
and the importance of product versus process innovations
(Tiddetal.,1997).Testingourhypothesesindifferentindus-
triesenablesustoassesshowfartheroleofaﬁrm’salliance
network for exploration and exploitation remains invari-
ant across industries, enhancing the generalization of the
results.
The focal ﬁrms that we study were observed over a 12-
year period, from 1986 until 1997. The panel is unbalanced
because of new start-ups and mergers and acquisitions.
The 116 companies were selected to include public com-
panies in these three industries that were also establishing
technology-based strategic alliances. Information on the
establishment of alliances is hard to obtain for small or
privately owned companies. Previous studies on interﬁrm
alliances also focused on leading companies in an industry
(Ahuja, 2000b; Gulati, 1995b).
In total, 994 alliances were established in the period
1986–1996 among these companies. Alliance data were
retrieved from the MERIT-CATI database, which contains
information on nearly 15 thousand cooperative technol-
ogy agreements and their ‘parent’ companies, covering the
period 1970–1996 (see Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002,f o r
a further description). Combining ﬁnancial data with the
CATI data on strategic alliances further reduced the ﬁnal
sample to 85 companies and 762 alliances.V. Gilsing et al. / Research Policy 37 (2008) 1717–1731 1723
Exploration, the dependent variable, is based on patent
counts.AllpatentingdatawereretrievedfromtheUSPatent
Ofﬁce Database for all the companies in the sample, also
those based outside the US. Working with US patents –
the largest patent market – is preferable to the use of sev-
eral national patent systems “...to maintain consistency,
reliability and comparability, as patenting systems across
nations differ in the application of standards, system of
granting patents, and value of protection granted” (Ahuja,
2000a, p. 434). Especially in industries where companies
operate on an international or global scale US patents may
be a good proxy for companies’ worldwide innovative per-
formance.
For companies in the three sectors the ﬁnancial data
were derived from a combination of Worldscope, Compus-
tat and data published in the companies’ annual reports.
3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Dependent variable
The different hypotheses test the effect of technological
distance, network position and overall network density on
the explorative innovation performance of companies in
the chemical, automotive and pharmaceutical industries.
To derive the dependent variable, technological proﬁles of
all focal companies were computed to ﬁnd out whether
newpatentsintheyearofobservationcouldbecategorized
as ‘explorative’. These technological proﬁles were created
by adding up the number of patents a ﬁrm received in
each patent class during the 5 years prior to the year of
observation. Different scholars have argued that a moving
window of 5 years is an appropriate timeframe for assess-
ing the technological impact of prior inventions (Podolny
and Stuart, 1995; Stuart and Podolny, 1996; Henderson
and Cockburn, 1996; Ahuja, 2000a). Studies of R&D depre-
ciation (Griliches, 1979, 1984) suggest that knowledge
capital depreciates sharply, losing most of its economic
value within 5 years. The USPTO classes were determined
at two-digit level, which resulted in approximately 400
classes.
From these technology proﬁles we can distinguish
between exploitative and explorative technology classes.
Classes in which a company receives a patent in the year
of observation but had not received a patent in the previ-
ous 5 years were considered ‘explorative’ patent classes.4
Since knowledge remains relatively new and unexplored
for a ﬁrm immediately after patenting, patent classes kept
their explorative ‘status’ for three consecutive years, par-
allel to Ahuja and Lampert’s (2001) concept of novel and
emerging technologies.5 All the classes in which a com-
pany had successfully applied for a patent the previous 5
years and successfully applied for a patent in the year of
observation were considered ‘exploitative’ patent classes.
4 We chose the year when the company ﬁled for the patent rather than
the year when it was granted, because the innovation in the company
already has been realized when the company ﬁles for a patent.
5 In order to test the robustness of this measure, we also constructed a
‘exploration patents’ variable where explorative patents could keep this
status for 5 years instead of 3 years.
3.2.2. Explanatory variables
Technological distance, centrality and overall network
density are the three explanatory variables that have to
be operationalized. The ﬁrst variable is based on USPTO
patent count data. The other two are calculated based
on the alliances that were established during the 5-year
period prior to the year of observation. This moving win-
dowapproachisconsideredtobeanappropriatetimeframe
during which the existing alliance portfolio is likely to have
an inﬂuence on the current technological performance of a
ﬁrm (Kogut, 1988, 1989; Gulati, 1995b).
Technological distance: Technological distance was mea-
suredonthebasisofCRTA,whichisthePearsoncorrelation
index of the distribution across technological classes of the
revealed technological advantages (RTA) of each ﬁrm rel-
ative to the other sample ﬁrms. The RTA of a ﬁrm in a
particular technological ﬁeld is given by the ﬁrm’s share
in that ﬁeld of the US patents granted to all companies
in the study, relative to its overall share of all US patents
granted to these companies. The RTA index varies around
one, such that a value higher than one suggests that a ﬁrm
is comparatively specialized in the technology in question,
given its overall innovative performance. Positive values
of CRTA indicate similarity of the pattern of relative tech-
nological specialization of ﬁrms, as it appears from the




A company’s RTA index in a patent class is deﬁned as its
share of patents in that class (compared to all its alliance
partners) divided by its share in all patent classes. The
correlation coefﬁcient was computed pairwise between
the RTA proﬁle of the focal ﬁrm and that of each of its
alliance partners. The CRTA variable is then calculated as
the average of these correlations. The values for CRTA can
theoreticallyvaryfrom−1to1.Aspositive(negative)values
indicate smaller (larger) technological distances, we chose
to transform this variable into a new one (‘Technological
distance’)withaminimumvalueofzeroandamaximumof
hundred, where higher values indicate larger technological
distance.
The values for this variable in Table 2 indicate that
the average technological distance is 42.4 with a standard
deviation of 7.1. The maximum distance is 52.5 and the
minimum 4.8.
Overall network density: This explanatory variable is a
characteristic of the overall alliance network in a partic-
ular year for one of the three industries. This variable
is “calculated as the number of all ties occurring in the
matrix divided by the number of all possible ties” (Knoke
and Kuklinski, 1982). Table 2 shows that the networks are
sparse. The networks are calculated for each year and each
industry: the density ranges from 0.5% to 2.9%. The average
is 1.3%.
Network centrality: The second variable related to a
ﬁrm’s alliance network is its betweenness centrality.
Betweenness centrality measures the centrality of a focal
ﬁrm in a network, and is calculated as the fraction of short-
est paths between other companies that pass through the
focal ﬁrm. Betweenness is, in some sense, a measure of the1724 V. Gilsing et al. / Research Policy 37 (2008) 1717–1731
Table 1
Deﬁnitions of dependent and independent variables
Variable name Variable description
Dependent variable
Explorative patents Number of patents a ﬁrm successfully ﬁled for in year t within patent classes in which it has
not been active in the 5 years prior to the given year. The status of explorative patent’ is kept
for 3 years
Independent variables
Technological distance The average of the correlations between the focal ﬁrm’s technology proﬁle and that of each of
its alliance partners. The variable is transformed; the values range from 0 to 100, with higher
values implying increasing distances between the technology portfolio of the focal ﬁrm and
that of its alliance partners
Network density The number of technological alliances in the network divided by all possible alliances between
the networking ﬁrms
Betweenness centrality The fraction of shortest paths of alliances between other companies that pass through the focal
ﬁrm. We standardized this measure to compare the values across different alliance networks;
values range from 0 to 100
Control variables
Age The number of years since a company was founded
Firm size (lnrevenues) Natural logarithm of the total sales of the ﬁrm in t−1( ×1000 Euro)
R&D intensity R&D expenditures in t−1 divided by total sales in t−1
Year Dummy variables for particular year, 1986–1997
Chemical company Dummy variable set to one if the ﬁrm is a chemical company (default=pharmaceutical
company)
Car manufacturer Dummy variable set to one if the ﬁrm is a car manufacturer (default=pharmaceutical
company)
Europe Dummy variable set to one if the ﬁrm is headquartered in Europe (default=Asian company)
US Dummy variable set to one if the ﬁrm is headquartered in the US (default=Asian company)
inﬂuence a focal ﬁrm has over the information through the
alliance network. In other words, it also forms a network-
wide(global)measureandtakesdirectandindirecttiesinto
account. This is important as this indicates how far a ﬁrm
canreachpotentiallyall(includingdistant)partsofthenet-
work. This provides us with an indication of the potential
for novel combinations that a ﬁrm may have.
Westandardizedthismeasuretocomparebetweenness
centralization of ﬁrms across different alliance networks –
different years and industries. In theory, standardized val-
uescanrangefrom0to100.Table2indicatesthatthevalues
for this variable range from 0 to 38. On average, ﬁrms have
a network position with a low value for betweenness cen-
trality, but there are a few companies that are in the midst
of the action.
Furthermore, we included the interaction terms in the
analyses because the hypotheses predict that technologi-
cal distance, network density and betweenness centrality
interact. Therefore, we standardize these three variables
prior to calculating their interaction terms, in order to
avoidunnecessarymulticollinearity(AikenandWest,1991;
Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004).
3.2.3. Control variables
Other variables can of course also affect the explorative
innovation performance of these ﬁrms. We included three
types of dummy variables. A ﬁrst indicates where the com-
pany is headquartered geographically. Following the Triad
concept of the world economy, a company can be head-
quartered in North America, Asia or Europe (Ohmae, 1985).
Firmsthatareheadquarteredindifferentcountriesmaydif-
fer in their propensity to patent. Annual dummy variables
were included to capture changes over time in the propen-
sity of companies to patent their innovations. Finally, we
included a dummy variable to indicate whether a com-
pany is a car manufacturer or chemical ﬁrm (default is the
pharmaceutical industry).
Furthermore, we included three organizational vari-
ables as controls.6 The ﬁrst is the age of the company. Older
ﬁrms, with their accumulated experience, are expected to
be better at exploitation, and younger ﬁrms, with lower
stakes and habituation in old technologies, better at explo-
ration. Hence, we expect a negative sign for the coefﬁcient
of this variable.
The natural logarithm of ‘corporate revenues’–ap r o x y
for ﬁrm size – was included as a control variable. Firm
size is expected to enhance exploitative learning (Acs and
Audretsch, 1991). Large ﬁrms have the ﬁnancial means
and vast technological and other resources to invest heav-
ily in R&D. However, they usually experience problems
in diversifying into new technological areas inhibiting
experimentation and favouring specialization along exist-
ing technological trajectories (Levinthal and March, 1993;
March, 1991; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). As a result, large
ﬁrms are disadvantaged with respect to exploring new
technological ﬁelds and will innovate proportionally less
thansmallerﬁrmsinnewtechnologicalareas(Nooteboom,
1991; Nooteboom and Vossen, 1995).
R&D intensity (R&D expenditures as a percentage of
sales) is expected to have a positive impact on exploration:
ﬁrms that invest heavily in R&D will have a higher rate
of innovation assuming that there exists a positive cor-
relation between technological input and output (Pakes
and Griliches, 1984). R&D investments also play a role in
6 Those variables were calculated for the year prior to the year of obser-
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the ability of companies to recognise, value and assimi-
late external knowledge. Absorptive capacity is crucial to
acquire and integrate external knowledge, especially when
the knowledge is tacit. Firms conduct R&D to be more
able to use the technology of other companies (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990; Kim, 1998; Mowery and Oxley, 1995).
3.3. Model estimation
The dependent variable is a count variable and only
takes nonnegative integer values—i.e. the number of
patents a ﬁrm ﬁled for in a particular year in patent classes
in which it has not issued patents during the past 5 years.
A Poisson regression approach provides a natural baseline
model for such data (Hausman et al., 1984; Henderson and
Cockburn, 1996). Since we use pooled cross-section data
with several observations on the same ﬁrms at different
points in time, we modelled the data using a random-
effects Poisson estimation.7
The basic Poisson model for event count data can be
written as follows:





where the parameter  it represents the mean and the vari-
ance of the event count and yit the observed count variable.
It is furthermore assumed that:
 it = ˇ xit. (11)
with xit being a vector of independent variables.
The above speciﬁcation assumes that the mean and
variance of the event count are equal. However, for
pooled cross-section count data the variance often exceeds
the mean. This overdispersion is particularly relevant in
the case of unobserved heterogeneity.8 The presence of
overdispersiondoesnotbiastheregressioncoefﬁcientsbut
the computed standard errors in the Poisson regression are
understated,resultinginanoverestimationofthestatistical
signiﬁcanceofthecoefﬁcients.Therefore,arandom-effects
Poisson estimator used: it does not assume within-ﬁrm
observational independence for the purpose of computing
standard errors. For the random-effects Poisson estimator
Eq. (2) is changed into:
 it = ˇ xit + ui (12)
where ui is a random effect for the ith ﬁrm and reﬂects the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity.
Unobserved heterogeneity may be the result of differ-
ences between companies in their innovation-generating
capabilities, and as a consequence in their propensity or
ability to patent. Such unobserved heterogeneity, if present
andnotcontrolledfor,canleadtooverdispersioninthedata
7 We used a Hausman speciﬁcation test (1978) to determine the choice
betweenarandom-andaﬁxed-effectsmodel.Thistestwasnotsigniﬁcant,
indicating that a random-effects model is consistent and efﬁcient for this
analysis.
8 Other papers within the same context as ours have also used the Pois-
son random-effects such as Ahuja (2000a)—where he also studies the role
of alliances within a context of technological inventions and considers a























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Determinants of the patent rate of ﬁrms in explorative patent classes, 1986–1997
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Explanatory variables
Technological distance 0.0631** (0.0282) 0.0441** (0.0208) 0.0634** (0.0291)
(Technological
distance)2
−0.0634** (0.0147) −0.0537*** (0.0152) −0.0412*** (0.0156)
Network density 0.1671*** (0.0308) 0.1877*** (0.0328) 0.1791*** (0.0331)
(Network density)2 −0.1028*** (0.0132) −0.1087*** (0.0134) −0.1208*** (0.0142)
Betweeness centrality 0.1258*** (0.0312) 0.1160*** (0.0376) 0.1209*** (0.0329)
(Betweenness
centrality)2












Firm size (lnsales) 0.4351*** (0.0459) 0.4269*** (0.0460) 0.4036*** (0.0459) 0.4113*** (0.0458) 0.3745*** (0.0462) 0.3676*** (0.0465)
R&D-intensity 1.1634*** (0.2452) 1.1325*** (0.2452) 1.0815*** (0.2467) 1.0779*** (0.2489) 0.9860*** (0.2472) 0.9430*** (0.2486)
Age −0.0014 (0.0025) −0.0015 (0.0025) −0.0020 (0.0025) −0.0015 (0.0024) −0.0021 (0.0024) −0.0027 (0.0024)
Car manufacturer −0.8821*** (0.3001) −0.8841*** (0.2980) −0.9476*** (0.3014) −0.8271*** (0.2904) −0.9402*** (0.2939) −0.9208*** (0.2972)
Chemical industry −0.5303** (0.2705) −0.5570** (0.2698) −0.5387** (0.2700) −0.4364* (0.2648) −0.4907* (0.2665) −0.5205* (0.2680)
Europe 0.4352 (0.2891) 0.3836 (0.2874) 0.3946 (0.2887) 0.3066 (0.2812) 0.2318 (0.2826) 0.2865 (0.2856)
Asia 0.0698 (0.2658) 0.0185 (0.2652) 0.0878 (0.2671) 0.0355 (0.2588) 0.0137 (0.2617) 0.0711 (0.2651)
Year dummy variablesa Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant −1.4792*** (0.5025) −1.321*** (0.5043) -0.8121 (0.5131) −1.2808** (0.4959) -0.4438 (0.5145) −0.3302 (0.5200)
Alpha 0.9890***b (0.1457) 0.9935*** (0.1445) 0.9989*** (0.1445) 0.9359*** (0.1389) 0.9572*** (0.1403) 0.9773*** (0.1431)
Number of ﬁrms 85 85 85 85 85 85
Number of ﬁrms-years 762 762 762 762 762 762
Log-Likelihood −3009.4 −2989.0 −2979.0 −2998.3 −2959.4 −2951.6
Likelihood ratio test
(d.f.)c
40.8*** 60.8*** 22.2*** 100.0*** 15.6***
d.f. (2) (2) (2) (6) (3)
Notes: Standard error between parentheses: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
a Year dummy variables are included in the regressions but the coefﬁcients and standard errors are not reported in the table.
b Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0.
c Likelihood-ratio test: model 2–5 vs. models 1 and 6 vs. model 5.V. Gilsing et al. / Research Policy 37 (2008) 1717–1731 1727
or serial correlation. Differences in patenting behaviour
between companies or between different years are cap-
tured by including dummy variables in the model. First,
the propensity to patent may be partly determined by the
nationality of the companies or the industry to which they
belong. Similarly, we introduced annual dummy variables




Table 1 represents the description of the different vari-
ables. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics and the
correlationsbetweenthevariablesforthe762observations
in the sample. Although the sample represents the promi-
nent ﬁrms in the three sectors, there is quite some variance
in most of the key variables.
Table 3 represents the results of the regression anal-
ysis using random-effects Poisson estimations to explain
explorative innovation performance of the ﬁrms in our
sample. The estimated alpha coefﬁcient is positive and
signiﬁcant. This indicates that important ﬁrm-level unob-
served effects are present in the data and that a panel
estimator is preferred above a pooled Poisson estimator.
We focus on the full model (model 6) but also provide
the basic model with only control variables (model 1) and
models that include only one explanatory variable (models
2–4),andamodelincludingthethreeexplanatoryvariables
but without the interaction terms (model 5), to show that
the coefﬁcients are robust over the different models and
that multicollinearity is not a particular problem in these
regressions.
Models 2, 3 and 4 introduce respectively technologi-
cal distance, network density and betweenness centrality
as explanatory variables. The likelihood ratio tests indi-
cate that the three models have more explanatory power
than model 1. In model 2, the coefﬁcients for the linear and
quadratic term of the technological distance variable have
the expected sign and are signiﬁcant. This result corrobo-
rates Hypothesis 1.
Model 3 introduces the betweenness centrality of each
focal ﬁrm and the overall network density as independent
variables. Hypothesis 2, claiming an inverse U-shaped rela-
tion between the betweenness centrality and exploration
is also corroborated. According to Hypothesis 3 we expect
thatexplorationisalsoaninverse-Ushapedfunctionofnet-
work density. The positive sign for the linear term and the
negative sign for the quadratic term indicate that we also
ﬁnd evidence for Hypothesis 3. The corroboration of the
ﬁrst three hypotheses also holds when the three explana-
tory variables are simultaneously introduced in model 5.
Model 6 introduces the pairwise interaction terms
betweenthethreeexplanatoryvariablestotestHypotheses
4–6. We expect a negative interaction effect between tech-
nological distance and betweenness centrality (Hypothesis
4), a positive interaction effect between technological
distance and density (Hypothesis 5), and a positive inter-
action effect between betweenness centrality and density
(Hypothesis 6). As Table 3 shows, the signs of these three
interaction terms are correct but the coefﬁcient for the





introduction of the three interaction terms is important in
explaining ﬁrms’ exploratory innovation performance.
There are also some interesting conclusions to draw
from the control variables in Table 3. First, the coefﬁcients
are stable over all the models, indicating the robustness of
the results. Next, there are signiﬁcant differences between
the three industries (chemical industry, car manufactur-
ing and pharmaceutical industry) in their propensity to
get involved in explorative innovation. The country of ori-
gin of the different companies plays no role in explaining
exploratory innovation.
Size has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on the rate
of innovation when ﬁrms are exploring new technological
areas.Sincethisexplanatoryvariableisinlogform,itscoef-
ﬁcientinthePoissonspeciﬁcationcanbeinterpretedasthe
elasticity between ﬁrm size and the dependent variable.
The coefﬁcient is substantially smaller than one suggest-
ing – ceteris paribus – that the frequency of patenting
increases with ﬁrm size but less than proportionately. As
a result, small ﬁrms are more innovative than larger ﬁrms
when they explore new technologies. This is in line with
the results of previous research on the relation between
ﬁrmsizeandR&D(NooteboomandVossen,1995),andwith
researchshowingthatnewandmoreradicalinventionsare
likely to originate within SMEs rather than in large ﬁrms
(Leifer et al., 2000; Utterback, 1994; Christensen, 1997).
This ﬁnding is also in line with the organizational learning
literature: large established organizations have difﬁcul-
ties in diversifying into new technological areas, inhibiting
experimentation and favouring specialization along exist-
ing technological trajectories (Levinthal and March, 1993;
March, 1991; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001).
Asexpected,R&Dintensityhasapositiveandsigniﬁcant
effect on the innovation rate of the companies in the sam-
ple. The age of the ﬁrm has a negative but non-signiﬁcant
effect on exploratory patents. This result suggests that
established companies that had time to develop capabil-
ities in particular technological ﬁelds do not necessarily
have a competitive advantage over new entrants in the
exploration of new technological ﬁelds. By contrast, the
negativecoefﬁcientforageindicatesthatnewlyestablished
ﬁrms might have a slight advantage in exploring new tech-
nological ﬁelds (although the evidence is inconclusive as
the coefﬁcient is not statistically signiﬁcant), in line with
previous research on the role of new ﬁrms in the creation
of new technologies (Methe et al., 1997).
5. Discussion and conclusions
The joint impact of the three explanatory variables is
best understood and consistent with the theoretical analy-
sis (as speciﬁed in formulae 6–8), if we take all variables in
model6–linear,quadraticandinteractionterms–simulta-
neously into consideration. To keep the analysis tractable,
we start from the observation that ﬁrms can control or
inﬂuence relations only with their direct partners and have1728 V. Gilsing et al. / Research Policy 37 (2008) 1717–1731
Fig. 2. Explorative innovation performance at mean level of network den-
sity.
virtually no possibilities to do so beyond their ego-network
(Bae and Gargiulo, 2003). Therefore, it seems reasonable
to consider global density as an exogenous variable for
the innovating ﬁrms. That leaves them with two variables
for dealing with their alliance network when engaging in
explorationendeavours,namelytheirnetworkpositionand
the technological distance with their partners.
Consider Fig. 2 that represents the joint effect of tech-
nologicaldistanceandnetworkcentrality,keepingnetwork
density constant at the mean level.
As the ﬁgure shows, a (highly) central position in the
network yields ample potential for a high exploration per-
formance, if one works with partners at a very limited
technological distance, and when supported by ‘sufﬁcient’
density (mean level). However, if working from such a
central position with partners that operate at a large(r)
technological distance, performance drops rapidly. The
interpretation of this ﬁnding may be as follows. Being
highly central implies a higher chance of being faced with
different kinds of knowledge and information (Burt, 1992).
This is beneﬁcial for novelty value but also creates a need
to understand and integrate potentially unrelated infor-
mation. Therefore, being a highly central player requires
exploration at small technological distances in order to be
able to absorb knowledge from all parts of the network.
The price for not doing so is a sharp decrease in one’s inno-
vation performance. Also note that the highest impact on
explorative innovation performance is found for ﬁrms with
a central position especially at a very small technological
distance.
In contrast, a highly peripheral position (at very low or
minimal BC) is a liability as it shows a much lower perfor-
mance compared to more central positions, although such
positions initially show an increase in innovation perfor-
mance when technological distance increases. Moreover,
being at the periphery can be advantageous at very high
levels of technological distance, where more central ﬁrms
perform comparatively less well. Being at the periphery
generallyimpliesthatoneisoutsidetheimmediatesightof
dominant and more central players. Because of this, selec-
tion forces to comply with dominant designs and existing
Fig. 3. Explorative innovation performance at mean level of technological
distance.
systems of production, organization, technical standards
and so on, may be somewhat less stringent. Hence, deviat-
ing from such prevailing ‘industry recipes’ (Spender, 1989)
becomes easier (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005). As a con-
sequence, ﬁrms at the periphery may enjoy more freedom
to experiment with partners at a high technological dis-
tance. It might be that this strategy yields more radical
innovations with potentially more technological and eco-
nomic value. However, the way we measure our dependent
variable (based on patent counts) does not take this into
account, an issue we come back to when discussing limita-
tions and possibilities for future research.
Still, ﬁrms also need to consider the degree of over-
all density and how it conditions their choices regarding
position and technological distance respectively. Consider
therefore Fig. 3, showing the relation between density and
betweenness centrality while keeping technological dis-
tance at its mean value.
Here we see that the effect of density on innovation
performance has a similar, curvilinear effect for both cen-
tralandperipheralpositions.Inotherwords,irrespectiveof
one’s position, high density inhibits the existence and uti-
lizationofdiversity,andhenceofnoveltyvalue,whileatlow
levels it does not support absorption sufﬁciently. We also
ﬁnd the highest impact on explorative innovation perfor-
mance at intermediate levels of betweenness centrality (at
leastwhentechnologicaldistanceiskeptatthemeanlevel).
However, a closer look at Fig. 3 reveals that high levels of
networkdensityincombinationwithhighlevelsofcentral-
ity also offer a fairly high impact on exploration. In short,
we can say that at average technological distances, central
companies in (fairly) dense networks have an advantaged
position to develop explorative innovations.
Following our ﬁndings, we can conclude that our key
argument is conﬁrmed, claiming that successful explo-
ration requires a delicate balance between the ‘twin tasks’
ofnoveltycreationontheonehandanditsefﬁcientabsorp-
tion on the other hand. We found that highly central
ﬁrms enjoy the strongest improvements of their explo-
rative innovation performance and this effect declinesV. Gilsing et al. / Research Policy 37 (2008) 1717–1731 1729
steadily when centrality decreases, or alternatively when
technologicaldistanceincreases.Peripheralpositionsshow
the least performance, although such positions can be
attractive when cooperating with partners at a very large
technological distance. In other words, success rates for
exploration are not spread equally across network posi-
tions.
However, position alone does not tell the full story. Our
empirical ﬁndings clearly indicate that exploration success
also depends on the two other dimensions of embedded-
ness, namely technological distance and network density.
Therefore, an important conclusion is that the three ele-
ments of network embeddedness need to be considered
jointly in order to understand their complementary effects
on both novelty creation and absorptive capacity. This is
an important ﬁnding and contributes to the literature in
several ways.
Oneisthatitcontrastswiththetraditionintheliterature
on alliances and interﬁrm networks with its bias towards
to the role of position (Powell et al., 2005). The message as
conveyed from this study is that for exploration the value
of a position depends on the technological distance from
others and on the degree of network density.
A second contribution is that the social network liter-
ature speciﬁcally considers ‘social distance’ between any
two nodes (here ﬁrms) in the network, in terms of the
number of links on the shortest path between them. Here
we have added technological distance between any two
ﬁrms. This has enabled us to go beyond the dominant
focus on partners’ similarity and to understand the pos-
itive role of technological distance in exploration. Such a
cognition-based view has been largely ignored by the lit-
erature with its main focus on the role of economic and
social factors regarding alliance formation and the role of
network embeddedness (Gulati, 1998; Phelps, 2005).
It also contributes to the literature on learning and
innovation that stresses the recombination potential aris-
ing from distances in cognition (Nelson and Winter, 1982;
Nooteboom, 2000; Malerba, 2004), but leaves unexplained
what are the associated social structural implications.
Moreover, considering the role of global density enables
one to go beyond the dyadic level, as has been mostly stud-
ied in the literature (Salancik, 1995; Gulati, 1998; Powell et
al., 2005). The focus on dyads reﬂects an undersocialized
view of alliances and ignores how far positive effects of a
central or peripheral position can be mitigated or ampli-
ﬁed by the entire structure. We found that this structure, in
terms of its density, indeed plays an important role and
conditions the potential beneﬁts of different degrees of
centrality for exploration. Both for central and peripheral
positions an intermediate degree of density seems to be
mosteffective.Incontrast,highlevelsofdensitymayinhibit




ferent light on the validity of the arguments of Burt versus
Coleman. Success in exploration requires a dual empha-
sis on the beneﬁts of non-redundant contacts for potential
novel combinations as well as on network density for inte-
grating the diverse inputs obtained from such contacts. In
other words, it seems that both views convey some truth
and may be seen as complements instead of opposites
as stressed in the literature (Hansen, 1999; McEvily and
Zaheer, 1999; Rowley et al., 2000; Ahuja, 2000b).
Limitations of this study, which may provide directions
forfutureresearch,areasfollows.Oneisthatwehavestud-
ied exploration that is new to the ﬁrm. In other words,
we cannot substantiate our claims and ﬁndings beyond
this relatively moderate degree of exploration. It therefore
seems useful in future studies to consider more radical
degrees of exploration such as the discovery of ‘newly
emerging’ technologies (new to the industry) or ‘pioneer-
ing’ technologies (new to the world), respectively (Ahuja
and Lampert, 2001). For these kinds of exploration one
needs partners at presumably (much) larger technological
distances than considered here and we anticipate that this
will have major implications for the role of both between-
ness centrality and density.
A second limitation relates to our dependent variable.
We have counted the number of explorative patents for
eachﬁrmandinthiswayhavetreatedallpatentsequally.Of
course, patents differ in technological and economic value,
and taking this into account would deﬁnitely enrich future
work in this ﬁeld. Weighing patents based on the number
of citations that they receive seems a straightforward way
to do this (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). Such an approach
would also enable studying the validity of our conjecture
that peripheral ﬁrms have better possibilities for more rad-
ical exploration when compared with central ﬁrms. A ﬁnal
limitation is that we did not consider the effect of ‘tie
strength’ on exploration. Different types of alliances can be
weighted according to the ‘strength’ of the relationship as
someauthorshavedone(seeContractorandLorange,1988;
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